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Abstract: As the revision process of Brussels I Regime has focused on 
the abolition of exequatur procedures, the interface between the 
Regulation and arbitration has been mostly a side note. Regardless of the 
fact that the systems of the Brussels I Regime and arbitration are two 
separate autonomous systems, overlapping issues arise. These interfaces 
have been discussed in the case-law of ECJ and later during the revision 
process. In the end, recitals elaborating the interface were added to the 
preamble of the Regulation, but no changes to the arbitration exclusion 
were introduced. The recital 12 aims to clarify how the arbitration 
exclusion adopted in the Regulation should be interpreted in the future. 
However, future case-law of ECJ is elemental to define the full meaning 
of the recitals. 
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1 Introduction - best of both worlds? 
 
1.1 Arbitration in Revision of Brussels I Regulation 
 
The revision process of the Brussels I Regime has been a multifaceted legislative 
project. The revision has focused on the abolition of exequatur, facilitation of 
prorogation agreements, and change of lis pendens effects in situations of exclusive 
jurisdiction to address the issue of “Italian torpedoes”. In addition to these, the Brussels 
I Regulation (Recast) (Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters) has sought to clarify several 
provisions in the Brussels I Regime. One of the side notes of this extensive project was 
to alleviate the difficulties caused by the interface between the Brussels I Regime and 
the system of arbitration.  
 
Originally, arbitration was excluded from the scope of the 1968 Brussels Convention 
(Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters). This exclusion was adopted later on in the Brussels I 
Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
hereinafter: old) as the exclusion had not been deemed problematic. In the field of 
international procedural law, this starting point could be considered almost self-evident 
as systems of civil procedure and arbitration are perceived distinctively separate and 
independent from each other. Both systems have similar objectives of alleviating 
dispute resolution, recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial 
disputes, but the evolution of these regimes, the separate doctrines and instruments have 
led to a division of labour between the two systems which have been regarded 
unproblematic for the most part.  
 
However, the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Brussels I Regime turned 
out to be less explicit than originally expected as collisions between the two systems 
started to emerge in case-law. Thus, the different options for addressing these interface 
issues were discussed in the revision process of the new Brussels Regulation. It should 
be noted that the starting point for the revision process was specifically to address the 
interface, not to diminish the role of arbitration within the EU.  
 
This article strives for giving a general view how the interface between civil procedure 
and arbitration got to be a controversial issue in the revision process and how the 
European legislator sought to address problems arising from this interface. First, the 
two systems and their main characteristics are discussed in order to depict how the 
systems overlap and in which areas collisions first started to emerge. Second, attention 
is drawn to the case-law of the CJEU, which further elaborated the extent of the 
exclusion and its legal effects. Third, we focus on the revision process and how 
interface issues were recognized and discussed during the legislative process and what 
solutions were suggested to be implemented in the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
Finally, we will offer some concluding remarks on the newly emerging legal status quo 
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concerning the interface between civil procedure and arbitration and briefly address the 
question what remains to be resolved.  
 
1.2 Systems of civil procedure and arbitration 
 
As stated above, arbitration and European civil procedure are two separate and 
autonomous systems for independent fields of dispute resolution. The European system 
of recognition and enforcement is a system of coordination between various state courts 
whereas international arbitration is a private system of dispute resolution operating with 
the support of various state courts. These starting points are obviously essential to the 
nature of the systems.  
 
Despite their differences, as systems of recognition and enforcement, they have a lot in 
common, too, especially on a general level of objectives. The European system of 
recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial disputes enhances, or 
better, enables the free movement of court decisions and free circulation of judgments 
in the European area. So the key to understanding it is the idea of trust in courts of other 
Member States. As in any system of recognition, trust is the key element also in the 
New York Convention1 and the system of international recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards created by the convention. In addition to the pure duty to recognize and 
enforce, the New York Convention also sets the framework for key elements of 
arbitration doctrine and especially the key elements of due process in arbitration 
(Kurkela, Turunen, 2010: 3–12). Once these key elements have been guaranteed, the 
states, respectively, agree to recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in another 
contracting state, and the enforcement can only be rejected on the grounds set in the 
Convention. So both systems, the New York Convention and the Brussels I Regime are 
built around the trust in the system of another state to lead to a result which can be 
recognized by the national system of the country in question.  
 
However, despite having the idea of trust in common, the history, purpose and 
territorial scope of the two systems is different. The system of arbitration created by the 
New York Convention is global and based on an autonomous Convention, whereas the 
European system is built on the European Union and the EU legal system. The Brussels 
I Regime is clearly a part of the European project whereas the New York Convention 
and the system of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is a project of the 
international commercial and arbitration communities. The Brussels I Regime works 
within the state court system and the bigger European idea to provide for a European 
judicial area whereas the New York Convention is basically securing the autonomy of 
private dispute resolution (see also Knuts, 2010: 457–458;  Bertoli, 2014:  277–278). 
 
The starting point for coordinating the coexistence of these two systems is, as already 
stated above that arbitration is excluded from the scope of the Brussels I Regime. The 
rationale is said to be that recognition and enforcement is governed by the New York 
Convention and all Member States are parties to that convention (See Mourre, A. and 
Vagenheim, 2009: 75). This sounds simple but the two parallel systems lead to 
problems. If the systems could be completely autonomous, there would probably be less 
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friction. However, arbitration and the system of arbitration relies on the support of state 
courts, in many issues during the procedure but also eventually in the execution of 
awards. Also, at times it needs to be decided in which system the parties have to solve 
their disputes and how the results, awards and judgments are then handled. 
 
1.3 Intersections and collision between the systems 
 
The interfaces between the systems are, firstly, evident in questions of jurisdiction of a 
state court in cases where there is an arbitration agreement. Secondly, intersections 
become visible in questions concerning arbitration-related ancillary issues in courts, 
such as the appointment of arbitrators and the validity or existence of an arbitration 
agreement and also protective measures. Thirdly, the overlapping systems have to be 
dealt with in cases of recognition and enforcement of awards and judgments when they 
relate to the same issues as well as decisions concerning setting aside the arbitral award. 
 
Chronologically the first area of overlap is the validity and existence of an arbitration 
agreement, which may come up even before any arbitration proceedings have been 
commenced. Concretely, this happens when proceedings are initiated in a state court 
and the respondent claims that the claim is covered by an arbitration agreement. The 
jurisdiction of courts in matters concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement is 
not regulated in the Brussels I Regime. Also, there are no common rules governing the 
validity of arbitration agreements which easily leads to conflicting decisions on the 
validity due to different applicable laws. Depending on the interpretation of the 
Brussels I Regime there might be situations in which a court has investigated and 
decided a case despite a jurisdictional claim based on an arbitration agreement or 
declined jurisdiction due to a claim that the issue falls under an arbitration agreement 
resulting in conflicting judgments - which may or may not circulate. It is clear, 
however, that due to the arbitration exception judgments purely on the validity or 
enforceability of arbitration agreements do not fall under the Brussels I Regulation if 
the question is not merely an incidental question (see Bertoli, 2014: 281).  
 
Arbitration does not function without court support. The national courts are needed for 
various measures ancillary to arbitration. These include measures relating to the 
appointment, dismissal and replacement of arbitrators, measures related to receiving 
evidence and the granting of protective measures. The jurisdiction regarding ancillary 
measures is not regulated in the Brussels I Regime but interface problems do occur (see 
Bertoli, 2014: 281). 
 
The most obvious collisions are created by circulating judgments in cases in which 
there is an arbitration agreement or possibly even an arbitral award. Also, challenging 
arbitral awards is not governed by the Brussels I Regime. Further, there are no rules 
governing the lis pendens between arbitration and parallel court proceedings relating to 
the validity or enforceability of arbitration agreements or to the substance of the 
dispute. Thus, the Brussels I Regime is not able to prevent parallel proceedings relating 
to arbitration agreements or to the substance of the dispute, or to solve the problem of 
conflicts of decisions rendered in parallel court and arbitral proceedings at the 
LEXONOMICA 
P. Hietanen-Kunwald, R. Koulu & S. Turunen: The New Brussels I Regime and 
Arbitration – Finding an Interface 
97 
 
enforcement stage (see Bertoli, 2014: 281).  
 
2 Addressing collisions in case-law 
 
2.1 From exclusion to interface 
 
The case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (before Court of Justice; 
hereinafter: CJEU) addresses points of collision that have arisen in the application of 
the Brussels I Regime. Although a part of the cases originates from the time the 
Brussels Convention was still in force, the doctrines developed have been upheld in the 
interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation (old). Most of the case-law deals with so-
called torpedo actions.2 It is typical for these cases that the jurisdiction of an arbitral 
tribunal located in one Member State of the European Union is challenged before the 
national court of another Member State of the European Union on the grounds that no 
valid arbitration agreement exists. The respondent in the arbitration proceedings 
typically files an action with a national court and disputes the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. Such action, if successful, may “sink” the seat of arbitration and therefore 
work as a torpedo to the seat of arbitration. But the significance goes beyond this. The 
case-law developed challenges the principle of competence-competence of the arbitral 
tribunal. The question that arises in this context is, whether and to what extent this is 
possible?    
 
In the following, four different cases will be reviewed. The first three cases give an 
account of the doctrine developed by the CJEU in relation to arbitration. In the cases 
Marc Rich3 and Van Uden4 the ECJ specifies the scope of the exclusion and sets the 
basis for its groundbreaking decision in West Tankers.5 The fourth case shows how this 
doctrine has been applied by the courts of England. 
 
Marc Rich concerned a dispute regarding the contamination of crude oil purchased by 
the Swiss company Marc Rich and Co. AG. The Italian company Società Italiana 
Impianti PA, the seller of the crude oil, initiated proceedings in Italy for a declaration 
that the company was not liable to Marc Rich and Co. AG.  At the same time, Marc 
Rich initiated arbitration proceedings in London, in which Impianti refused to take part. 
As a consequence, Marc Rich commenced proceedings in the English Commercial 
Court for the appointment of an arbitrator. Impianti disputed the validity of the 
arbitration agreement before the Commercial Court, while Marc Rich relying on the 
arbitration agreement challenged the jurisdiction of the Italian court. Impianti contended 
that the real dispute between the parties concerned the question whether or not the 
contract contained an arbitration clause, and that the dispute, therefore, fell within the 
scope of the Convention and, thus, was to be adjudicated in Italy. It argued further that 
the arbitration exclusion of the Brussels Convention would only apply to the arbitration 
proceedings as such, and not to related proceedings before the national courts. Marc 
Rich, on the other hand, took the view that the dispute fell outside the scope of the 
Brussels Convention in virtue of its exclusion regarding arbitration. The Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales referred the question of whether or not the proceedings in 
England came within the scope of the Brussels Convention to the CJEU.  
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The CJEU first examined whether the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the 
Brussels Convention also extended to arbitration-related proceedings before national 
courts such as the appointment of an arbitrator. It found that the appointment of an 
arbitrator by a national court was part of the process of commencing arbitration 
proceedings and therefore caught by the exclusion. Adopting a broad definition of 
arbitration the CJEU held that not only the arbitration proceedings as such but 
arbitration in its entirety was excluded from the scope of application of the Brussels 
Convention.   
 
The CJEU further examined, whether the dispute regarding the validity of the 
arbitration agreement brought the dispute within the scope of the Convention. The 
CJEU held that regard must be had to the subject matter of the main dispute. If by virtue 
of its subject matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, a dispute fell outside the 
scope of the Convention, the existence of a preliminary question did not justify the 
application of the Convention. The court noted that it would be contrary to the principle 
of legal certainty, if the exclusion varied according to the existence of a preliminary 
issue, such as the validity of an arbitration agreement.6 It found that arbitration in its 
entirety, including legal proceedings before national courts, was exempt from the 
application of the Convention if the main subject-matter was arbitration.   
 
The case Van Uden concerned protective measures and the question whether a national 
court had jurisdiction to order interim measures if the dispute regarding the substance of 
the case was subject to arbitration. The question was raised in the context of a dispute 
between Van Uden Maritime BV and the German Company (Deco Line) regarding the 
payment of debts. Van Uden had initiated arbitration proceedings in the Netherlands 
regarding the payment of invoices. Van Uden also applied to the District Court in 
Rotterdam for interim relief and requested an order against Deco-Line. Deco Line did 
not dispute the validity of the arbitration agreement, but contested the jurisdiction of the 
Netherland Court to grant interim relief. It claimed that it could only be sued in 
Germany, where it had its seat. The Netherland Court referred the case to the CJEU in 
order to determine, whether the state court had jurisdiction to issue protective measures, 
even though an arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
The CJEU noted that a court having jurisdiction in the substance of the case had in 
general also jurisdiction to order provisional or protective measures. In addition, a state 
court might order interim measures under Article 247 of the Convention. This provision 
added a jurisdiction in respect of provisional or protective measures, where the court of 
another Member State had jurisdiction as to the substance of the case. As there was an 
arbitration agreement, there was no state court that had jurisdiction as regards the 
substance of the dispute. Consequently, only Article 24 would confer a state court the 
jurisdiction to grant interim measures. The defendant contended that interim measures 
fell outside the scope of the Convention as they were bound to the subject matter and 
ancillary to arbitration. The claimant argued that the existence of an arbitration clause 
did not have the effect of excluding an application for interim measures from the scope 
of the Brussels Convention.  
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The CJEU held that interim measures were not ancillary to arbitration, but ordered in 
parallel to such proceedings. These measures did not concern arbitration as such, but 
served the protection of wider rights. Their place in the Convention was thus 
“determined not by their own nature but by the nature of the rights which they serve to 
protect.”8  The CJEU upheld its doctrine regarding the subject matter of the dispute. It 
held that the Convention was applicable, where the subject matter of an application for 
provisional measures fell within the scope ratione materiae of the Convention. Article 
24 of the Convention, therefore, conferred jurisdiction on the court hearing the 
application even where the proceedings regarding the substance of the case were to be 
conducted before arbitrators.  
 
This doctrine - that the application of the subject matter determined the applicability of 
the Brussels I Regime - was confirmed in the West Tankers case. This case concerned a 
dispute regarding damages caused by a vessel owned by West Tankers and chartered by 
Erg Petroli.  The charter-party provided for arbitration in London. Erg obtained 
compensation from its insurers up to the insured limit and initiated arbitration against 
West Tankers for the excess. The insurers initiated proceedings before the state court 
(Tribunale de Siracusa) in Italy for recovery of the sums paid to Erg. West Tankers 
disputed the jurisdiction of the Tribunale de Siracusa on the basis of the existence of the 
arbitration agreement. In addition, West Tankers initiated parallel proceedings before 
the English Commercial Court requesting a) declaration that the dispute between West 
Tankers and the insurers was to be settled by arbitration and b) an anti-suit injunction 
order that would prevent the insurers from pursuing proceedings in Italy.9 On appeal, 
the House of Lords referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.  
 
The question submitted to the CJEU in West Tankers was whether it was compatible 
with the old Brussels I Regulation to issue anti-suit injunctions to battle parallel 
proceedings or whether these injunctions were incompatible with EU law. According to 
the doctrine of mutual trust that had been developed by the CJEU in the case Gasser10 
and Turner11 anti-suit injunction that restrained the parties from initiating proceedings 
in another Member State were not compatible with the system established by the 
Brussels I Regime – at least in cases where two state courts were involved. This was 
because the Brussels I Regime set out a complete set of uniform rules on the allocation 
of jurisdiction between the courts of the Member States and the national courts must 
trust each other that these rules would be applied correctly by the court of another 
Member State. The question was, whether this reasoning applied also to arbitration, 
which was exempted from the application of the Brussels I Regulation (old).  
 
The CJEU reiterated that the subject matter of the dispute and more specifically the 
nature of the rights which the proceedings in question served to protect determined the 
applicability of the Brussels Regulation. If the subject-matter of the dispute came within 
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation also a preliminary issue concerning the 
applicability, including the validity and existence of an arbitration agreement fell within 
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. The court held that the proceedings, such as 
those in the main proceedings, which led to the making of the anti-suit injunction, 
could, therefore, not come within the scope of the old Brussels I Regulation. However, 
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these proceedings might have consequences that undermine the effectiveness of the 
Brussels I Regulation. This is the case where “such proceedings prevent a court of 
another Member State from exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it [by the Brussels I 
Regulation]”.12  The CJEU found that the subject matter of the proceedings before the 
Italian court concerned a claim for damages and fell therefore within the scope of the 
Regulation. As a consequence also the preliminary issue concerning the applicability of 
an arbitration agreement, including its validity fell within the scope of the Regulation. 
The granting of an anti-suit injunction would prevent a court that would normally have 
jurisdiction from ruling on its own jurisdiction under the Brussels Regulation. Referring 
to the cases in Gasser and Turner and the principle of trust, the CJEU held that once 
seized the Italian court had the power to determine whether it had jurisdiction to resolve 
the dispute and to decide on the application of an arbitration agreement as a preliminary 
question. It added that anti-suit injunctions would deprive the plaintiff who considered 
the arbitration agreement invalid of his right to access to justice.  In the substance, the 
CJEU decided that an injunction restraining a party from commencing or continuing 
proceedings in a court of a Member State that had jurisdiction under the regulation was 
incompatible with the system established by the old Brussels I Regulation. 
 
After the judgment in West Tankers it became clear that the issuing of anti-suit 
injunctions was contrary to the Brussels I Regulation if it prevented the national court 
of a Member State from determining its own jurisdiction in respect of a subject matter 
falling within the scope of the Brussels Regulation. It remained, however, open, 
whether a decision of a national court on the validity of an arbitration agreement was a 
judgment within the Brussels I Regime and enforceable as such.13  
 
This question was addressed by English courts in the case National Navigation Co v 
Endesa Generacion SA.14 In this case, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
considered whether a judgment of another Member State that fell within the Brussels I 
Regime must be recognized in English Court proceedings which themselves fell outside 
the regime by virtue of the arbitration exception. The case illustrates how West Tankers 
was interpreted and its application extended by the national courts.  
 
The main facts of the case were as follows: National Navigation Co, an English 
company, signed a bill of lading with Endesa Generación S.A. (“Endesa”), a Spanish 
company pertaining to the delivery of a cargo of coal onboard a vessel Wadi Sudr.  The 
delivery of the coal was delayed and a dispute arose.  Endesa initiated court proceedings 
before the Mercantile Court of Alméria, Spain, seeking damages for late delivery under 
the bill of lading. National Navigation initiated proceedings in the English Commercial 
Court, seeking a declaration of non-liability. National Navigation objected to the 
jurisdiction of the Spanish court, relying on, inter alia, an arbitration clause contained 
in a charter-party that it alleged was incorporated into the bill of lading. Endesa denied 
that it was bound by the charter-party and the arbitration clause.  
 
The Almeria court held that no arbitration clause was incorporated into the contract and 
refused to decline jurisdiction on that basis. National Navigation initiated arbitration 
proceedings in London seeking a declaration that the arbitration clause was 
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incorporated and the granting of an anti-suit injunction. Endesa asserted in the 
Commercial Court proceedings that the court was bound by the decision of the Spanish 
court. The Commercial Court dismissed the application for an anti-suit injunction. It 
also accepted that the judgment of the Spanish Court was a regulation judgment, but 
found that it was not binding in proceedings which were, themselves, excluded from the 
scope of the Brussels Regulation by virtue of the arbitration exception. However, this 
view was not maintained by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the 
decision of the Spanish court was res judicata in England, with respect to both court 
proceedings and arbitral proceedings. Therefore, the English courts could not re-
examine the issue of applicability of the arbitration clause. The National Navigation 
case, therefore, demonstrated that a judgment ruling on the preliminary issue of the 
validity and existence of an arbitration agreement rendered by the court of one Member 
State was – under English law - recognized and enforced under the rules of the Brussels 
Regulation.  
 
The development of the case-law and in particular the judgment in the National 
Navigation case showed that the two regimes were interwoven despite the explicit 
arbitration exclusion of the Brussels I Regulation. The development gave rise to 
uncertainty on the meaning and effect of the arbitration exclusion.  It was feared that the 
case-law would trigger a rush to the courts, parallel proceedings and contradictory 
judgments. The arbitration community saw the European arbitration market 
endangered.15   
 
3 Debate on revision 
 
The debate whether and how the interface should be addressed has been mostly a 
balancing act between preserving the status quo and solving the emerged overlap areas. 
To put it concretely, the discussion has focused on the question whether new provisions 
for this purpose should be introduced or not.  
 
3.1 The Heidelberg Report 
 
The discussion on possible needs for revision of the interface between the Brussels I 
Regime and arbitration began in 2007 when the so-called Heidelberg Report was 
introduced.16 The work on the report began already in 2005, and the report was finalised 
before the decision in the West Tankers case in the CJEU. 
 
The extensive report took notice of the collision points between the systems and 
depicted the overall picture of the status quo. The report highlighted that the New York 
Convention was considered to be a well-functioning international instrument which was 
also adopted as a starting point when the Brussels Convention was first negotiated in 
the 1960s. Although the EC Treaty of 1958 explicitly enabled regulating arbitration, for 
these historical reasons the arbitration exclusion was included in the convention 
(Heidelberg Report, 2007: 50.). In addition to this, the exclusion followed also from the 
European Council’s consideration that a European parallel instrument for arbitral 
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awards could be introduced to further facilitate free movement of awards within the EU. 
However, such instrument was never adopted.  
 
As the Heidelberg Report points out, the national reports showed that the exclusion of 
arbitration from the scope of the Regulation was the predominant opinion. According to 
the UK national report, an extension of the scope could undermine the functioning of 
the New York Convention. Also, the national report of France concluded that an 
extension would not further facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards. Other national 
reports voiced similar opinions (Heidelberg Report, 2007: 51–54). 
 
The Heidelberg Report recognized several overlap areas where the Brussels I Regime 
and arbitration regime collided. These collisions include a) enforcement of a void or 
valid arbitration agreement including declaratory judgments on the validity or 
arbitration clause, b) ancillary measures, c) inconsistent recognition of judgments as in 
some Member States judgments on merits are recognized under the Regulation and 
some are not, and d) conflicting arbitral awards and judgments and the open question 
whether an arbitration agreement or pending arbitration should have lis pendens effect 
although the old Brussels I Regulation states that it should not be applied. The 
Heidelberg Report also points out that in some Member States judgments endorsing 
arbitral awards are recognized under the Regulation (Heidelberg Report, 2007: 55–56). 
Based on this, unpredictability and inconsistent application of the Regulation to issues 
related to arbitration is one of the key factors in interface collisions.  
 
During the whole revision process related to the interface, the importance of the New 
York Convention has been highlighted. The starting point for the revision has been to 
respect the regime created by the convention and possible solutions to the interface 
issues have circled around finding guiding principles to clarify how the two regimes 
could more effectively coexist and cooperate. Already in the Heidelberg Report it was 
stated that the “regulation should not address issues dealt with by the New York 
Convention”. Thus, no directly overlapping articles should be included in the revised 
Regulation. However, it is pointed out that additional and supporting provisions would 
not undermine the arbitration regime (Heidelberg Report, 2007: 54). The discussion 
how the deletion of the arbitration exclusion would affect the coexistence of the two 
systems is valuable. The work conducted in drafting the report is particularly important 
as it has – and still is- enabled fruitful discussion on the interface. In legal literature 
Azzali and de Santis have highlighted in a similar vein that “[a]t the European level, 
there is no uniform application of the New York Convention, because each Member 
State interprets its rules differently. --- On the other hand,  such a situation gives rise to 
some anomalies in the functioning of the system, such as parallel proceedings, with 
conflicting decisions, which undermine the certainty and the stability of commercial 
relations in the EU internal market.” (see Azzali, de Santis, 2012: 74).    
 
In addition to this, the report proposes that recognizing a judgment from another 
Member State should be barred if said judgment sets aside the arbitration agreement, in 
other words, non-respect of arbitration agreement would prevent the enforcement 
through Brussels I Regime. A crucial issue related to this is the question whether an 
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arbitral award can be assimilated to a judgment and the importance of residual control 
of procedural fairness necessary as awards are heterogeneous. Based on this, the report 
concludes that no such inclusion should be introduced. However, a specific instrument 
for the interface would be advisable where exclusive jurisdiction for recognition of 
arbitral awards would be with the courts where the award was given and that such 
decision would be enforced in other Member States “without any additional formality” 
(Heidelberg Report, 2007: 63). 
 
Possible options for the recast were discussed in the Heidelberg Report. One option was 
to leave the whole interface issue as it was and not to extend the scope of the new 
regulation to include provisions on arbitration. The report emphasizes that no 
fundamental changes should be introduced but at the same time points out that the 
present status quo is not satisfactory. Following this, it is suggested that an exclusive 
jurisdiction in arbitration-related cases would be granted to the courts of the place of 
arbitration, and, to further facilitate the determination of this court of jurisdiction, a 
guideline stipulating uniform rules for the determination would be introduced 
(Heidelberg Report, 2007: 59–60).  
 
To conclude, the Heidelberg Report provided for measures to overcome the interface 
issues either through the deletion of the arbitration exclusion and emphasizing the 
prevalence of New York Convention, or through provisions clarifying the interface. In 
any case, changes to the old status quo were recommended. This second “positive and 
more comprehensive” approach would be reached through provisions in granting 
exclusive jurisdiction in ancillary measures and in recognizing the arbitral award to 
courts of the place of arbitration (Heidelberg Report, 2007: 64 – 65).  
 
As Advocate General Wahelet points out in his opinion on the Gazprom case,17 the 
Heidelberg Report was given before the West Tankers judgment. In West Tankers the 
General Advocate Kokott had stated that as there were no means of coordinating 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals with jurisdiction of courts and hence, “only the 
inclusion of arbitration in the scheme of the old Brussels I Regulation could remedy the 
situation”,18 an opinion upon which the CJEU agreed.  
 
3.2 The Commission’s Green Paper 2009 and Public Consultation 
 
In spring 2009, the Commission adopted a Report and a Green Paper on the application 
and review of the old Brussels I Regulation.19 Both of these instruments renewed the 
conclusions reached in the Heidelberg Report and therefore the Commission proposed a 
partial deletion of the arbitration exclusion. The Green Paper emphasized that the New 
York Convention was important and its role should not be undermined through the 
revision of the Brussels I Regulation, but, the emerged interface issues should be 
addressed. The Commission stated in the Green Paper that:  
 
“In particular, a (partial) deletion of the exclusion of 
arbitration from the scope of the Regulation might improve 
the interface of the latter with court proceedings. As a result 
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of such a deletion, court proceedings in support of arbitration 
might come within the scope of the Regulation. A special 
rule allocating jurisdiction in such proceedings would 
enhance legal certainty. For instance, it has been proposed to 
grant exclusive jurisdiction for such proceedings to the 
courts of the Member State of the place of arbitration, 
possibly subject to an agreement between the parties.”20 
 
In addition, the Commission considered that such deletion could further facilitate 
arbitration as clear jurisdiction rules on provisional measures would be introduced. 
Also, the Commission addressed the difficult issue of parallel proceedings in the courts 
and arbitration by claiming that the deletion might ensure the recognition of a judgment 
setting the arbitral award aside in situations where the arbitration agreement is held 
valid in one Member State and invalid in another.21 
 
The public consultation opened asked for opinions regarding the interface and actions 
that would be appropriate to strengthen the effectiveness of arbitration agreements, 
ensure good coordination between parallel court and arbitration proceedings and 
enhance the effectiveness of arbitral awards.  
 
In the Commission’s report, parallel proceedings and the inconsistent practice of 
recognition in the Member States were addressed. According to the report, the New 
York Convention usually functions adequately, but, interface issues arise e.g. when an 
arbitration agreement is held valid by the arbitration tribunal but not by the court. It is 
also pointed out that the recognition and enforcement of judgments on the validity of 
the arbitration agreement is uncertain.22 According to the report, the pain spots of the 
status quo included 1) parallel proceedings, 2) national laws strengthening arbitration 
which are incompatible with the Regulation, and 3) the lack of uniform allocation of 
jurisdiction in ancillary or supportive proceedings. In addition, it was pointed out that 
the recognition of a judgment was uncertain if such judgment disregarded an arbitration 
clause. Also, it is pointed out in the report that “the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards, governed by the New York Convention, is considered less swift and 
efficient than the recognition and enforcement of judgments”.23 
 
The public consultation launched by the Green Paper on the interface between the 
Brussels I Regime and arbitration provided opinions from several experts, stakeholders, 
arbitration institutes and others.24 Most of the stakeholders adopted a negative stance 
towards a partial deletion of the arbitration exclusion.25 As a result, the public 
consultation provided divergent opinions on which would be the best way forward to 
battle parallel proceedings and enhance arbitration within the European Judicial Area. 
However, most stakeholders considered the New York Convention to be a satisfactory 
instrument within the EU and its role should not, therefore, be diminished through the 
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3.3 Commission’s Proposal for Brussels I (Recast) and the Parliamentary 
process 
 
The Commission noted the opinions received through the public consultation in its 
impact assessment and pointed out that the three possibilities concerning arbitration 
where either 1) to uphold the status quo, which would not prevent abusive litigation 
tactics, 2) to extend the exclusion also to proceedings where the validity or arbitration 
agreement was contested, so that such judgments would not be governed by the 
Brussels I Regulation (Recast), or 3) to improve the effectiveness of arbitration through 
staying the proceedings in a court in cases concerning arbitration if an arbitral tribunal 
or court of the seat of arbitration was seized.26  
 
The Commission chose the third policy option to enhance the effectiveness of 
arbitration by partial deletion of the arbitration exclusion. The Commission’s proposal 
for Brussels I Regulation (Recast) included a specific rule which would have aimed at 
improving the interface between the two systems and to prevent parallel proceedings in 
the courts and arbitration tribunals. The specific rule in Article 29 would have obligated 
the courts to stay its proceedings if its jurisdiction would be contested on the basis of an 
arbitration agreement. According to the Commission’s proposal, such provision would 
“eliminate the incentive for abusive litigation tactics”.27 Also, the proposal included 
recitals which would address abusive litigation tactics, place of arbitration, proceedings 
pending before courts of third States and protective measures. It should be pointed out 
that online arbitration was not discussed in the proposal, although its importance is 
increasing also in the EU.28 
 
During the parliamentary process different opinions were discussed. During the public 
consultation many opinions voiced that the partial inclusion of arbitration into the 
Brussels I Regime was not supported.29 The European Employment and Social 
Committee adopted on December 16, 2009 a relatively positive position towards a 
partial inclusion of arbitration as it considered this to “safeguard measures to support 
arbitration, allow for the recognition of judgments on the validity of an arbitration 
agreement and, facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments involving an 
arbitration award.”30 The Legal Affairs Committee adopted the stance of maintaining 
the exclusion and facilitating the interface issue through recitals in its report on 
29.6.2010.31 The European Parliament adopted on September 7, 2010, an oppositional 
stance to the Commission’s proposal of partial inclusion.32 In its note June 1, 2012, the 
Council adopted a negative stance towards a partial inclusion and suggested that the 
Commission’s proposal should be rejected.33 
 
In the end, the arbitration exclusion was upheld and new recitals were included and, 
after the Council had accepted the wording, the European Parliament adopted the 
legislative resolution on November 20, 2012.  
 
However, no provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction or on parallel proceedings were 
accepted. It is clear that the result was mainly a compromise.34 Recasting the Brussels I 
Regulation is a politically significant feat and its main objective was abolishing the 
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exequatur procedure. While considering the objectives behind the whole revision 
process, it becomes evident that the interface between the Regulation and arbitration, 
although a significant and complicated question in itself, was mainly a side note. In the 
end, no significant changes were made, but, the status of the new recitals and how they 
will affect the future case-law is still unknown. 
 
4 Changes to the old status quo 
 
As a result of the revision debate, the preamble 12 was included in the Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast). The objective of the recitals is two-fold: on the one hand, they 
confirm the existing doctrine and the status quo defined by the CJEU, on the other 
hand, they aim at further clarifying and guide the future case-law. Advocate General has 
in the Gazprom case considered the recital to “---somewhat in the manner of a 
retroactive interpretative law, explains how that exclusion must be and always should 
have been interpreted”.35  
 
In addition to the new recital, the arbitration exclusion in Article 1 (2) was maintained. 
Also, a new article 73 was introduced which provides for the relation between the 
Regulation and the New York Convention. According to the article 73 (2), “this 
Regulation shall not affect the application of the 1958 New York Convention.” It is 
uncertain how the article will be applied in the future acquis, but the provision should 
be understood to emphasize the precedence of the New York Convention when 
applicable. This principle has been the starting point already in the Heidelberg Report 
and has been renewed several times also during the legislative process.  
 
There are four paragraphs in the new recital first of which confirms the existing 
doctrine based on the negative effect of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. The first 
recital provides that “This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this 
Regulation should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seized of an action in a 
matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, from 
referring the parties to arbitration, from staying or dismissing the proceedings, or from 
examining whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable 
of being performed, in accordance with their national law.” Similarly, the paragraph 4 
excludes also ancillary proceedings related to arbitration which follows from the CJEU 
case-law (See also Hauberg Wilhelmsen, 2014: 169).  
 
However, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the recital strive for further clarifications of the existing 
status quo. Paragraph 2 seeks to avoid the controversy of the West Tankers and 
National Navigation cases.  
 
According to paragraph 2 of the recital 12, “A ruling given by a court of a Member 
State as to whether or not an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and 
enforcement laid down in this Regulation, regardless of whether the court decided on 
this as a principal issue or as an incidental question.” According to the Advocate 
General Wahelet in Gazprom case, paragraph 2 of recital 12 closely resembles the 
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policy option 2 of the Commission’s proposal, i.e. extension of the arbitration exclusion 
to all disputes where the validity of arbitration agreement was contested.36 
 
Paragraph 3 of the recital 12 provides for the continuation of circulation of judgments 
on the merits. Based on this, enforcing an arbitral award despite judgment on the merits 
is not a breach of Member States’ obligations. Paragraph 3 provides that “On the other 
hand, where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction under this Regulation or 
under national law, has determined that an arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed, this should not preclude that court’s 
judgment on the substance of the matter from being recognized or, as the case may be, 
enforced in accordance with this Regulation. This should be without prejudice to the 
competence of the courts of the Member States to decide on the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York on 10 June 1958 (‘the 
1958 New York Convention’), which takes precedence over this Regulation.”  
 
In any case, it is apparent that the new recital does not provide a solution for the 
problem of parallel proceedings. As stated above, the revision process itself sheds light 
on the reasons why this key issue was not addressed, as during the public consultation 
and the EP legislative process many concerns were voiced that partial inclusion would 
only confuse the issue further and could prove to be detrimental to the dispute 
resolution market. 
 
It should be noted that, the full meaning of the recital remains open. However, a first 
indication of the impact of the recital was given shortly after the Brussels I Regulation 
(Recast) entered into force by the ECJ in its ruling in the case C-536/13 Gazprom OAO 
on the interpretation of the old Brussels I Regulation. The Brussels I Regulation 
(Recast) entered into force on January 10, 2015, but the ECJ’s judgment on the 
interpretation of the earlier regulation (44/2001) in the Gazprom case was rendered on 
May 13, 2015.37  
 
The facts of the Gazprom case are as follows. The Lithuanian company Lietuvas dujos 
(LD) bought gas from Gazprom in Russia for distribution in Lithuania. The company’s 
main shareholders were a German company E.ON Ruhrgas International GmbH (38,91 
%), Gazprom (37.1 %) and the state of Lithuania (17.7. %). In 2004 the main 
shareholders had concluded a shareholders’ agreement, which included an arbitration 
clause. In 2011 the Lithuanian government initiated proceedings concerning LD and its 
general manager in Lithuania. Gazprom stated that these proceedings were in breach of 
the shareholders’ agreement and commenced arbitration proceedings in Stockholm. In 
2012 the arbitral tribunal declared that there had been a partial breach of the agreement 
and ordered the Lithuanian government to withdraw the proceedings in Lithuania. After 
this Gazprom sought to have the arbitral award recognised and enforced in Lithuania, 
which the Lithuanian Court of Appeal refused on the basis of public policy. After 
Gazprom’s appeal, the Supreme Court of Lithuania evaluated the award to include an 
anti-suit injunction and made a reference to ECJ for a preliminary ruling.  
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The case revived the question, whether anti-suit injunctions issued not by a national 
court but by an arbitral tribunal situated in another Member State were contradictory to 
the Brussels I Regime.   
 
In the opinion of the Advocate General the recitals of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) 
should be taken into consideration in deciding the case, which started as a request for a 
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the old Regulation. According to the 
Advocate General, the recitals formulate a clear rejection by the legislator of the 
principles established in West Tankers38, especially when seen in the context of the 
legislative history.39 Thus the Advocate General suggests to re-establish the 
interpretation that has been prevalent in the Marc Rich case. The arbitration exclusion 
must in his view be interpreted widely and anti-suit injunctions would therefore not be 
contrary to the Brussels I Regime (Recast). Hence, the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards should be exclusively governed by the New York Convention and the 
Brussels I Regime must be interpreted as not requiring the court of a Member State to 
refuse to recognize and enforce an anti-suit injunction issued by an arbitral tribunal. In 
addition the Advocate General stated that the fact that arbitral award included an anti-
suit injunction was not a sufficient ground for refusing to recognize the award on the 
basis of the New York Convention. The question after the Advocate General’s opinion 
was whether the court would follow it or come to some alternative conclusion.  
 
In its judgment, CJEU stated that the old Brussels I Regulation should be interpreted as 
not precluding a court of a Member State from recognizing and enforcing, or from 
refusing to recognize and enforce, an arbitral award prohibiting a party from bringing 
certain claims before a court of that Member State. The court reasoned that this 
followed from the scope of the old regulation, as it does not govern the recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award issued by an arbitral tribunal in another Member State. 
In other words, the CJEU lined itself to some extent along the Advocate General’s 
opinion that anti-suit injunctions were not contrary to the Brussels I Regime. However, 
this position of the CJEU does not reverse the impact of the West Tankers case, as in 
the Gazprom case the award in question was not an anti-suit injunction within the 
meaning of West Tankers case. The proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitral award are governed by the applicable national and international law 
applicable in the Member State where enforcement is sought.  
 
The judgment has been widely discussed in legal literature. A focal question is the 
relationship between the Gazprom and West Tankers judgments. Carlos Gonzáles-
Bueno and Laura Lozano argue that the judgment failed to address the ban on anti-suit 
injunctions established in West Tankers on the basis of the old Brussels I Regulation, 
although anti-suit injunctions could be used to prevent parallel proceedings. However, 
the authors predict that the CJEU will address the issue in further detail in further 
preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) and the 
role of the Regulation’s recitals (Gonzáles-Bueno, Lozano, 2015: 85–97). Maximilian 
Sattler, in turn, argues that the CJEU’s reasoning in the Gazprom judgment is 
surprisingly short and that “the CJEU’s conclusion – that the recognition and 
enforcement of the award do not violate Regulation 44/2001 (paras 39 and 41) – comes 
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somewhat out of the blue”. The only ground given for the conclusion is the arbitration 
exclusion, which, in fact, has been established already in West Tankers (Sattler, 2016: 
342–354). According to both Sattler and Trevor Hartley, the Gazprom judgment does 
not reverse the West Tankers judgment (Sattler, 2016: 342–354; Hartley, 2015: 965–
975). In addition, Hartley points out that the CJEU changed the basis of the anti-suit 
prohibition in the Gazprom judgment from the sole wording of the Brussels I 
Regulation to “the general principle which emerges from the case-law of the Court”, 
using the court’s own formulation. Hartley considers that this shift to a broader case-
law-based prohibition of anti-suit injunctions gives the court more room to manoeuvre 
in future decisions (Hartley, 2015: 965–975).    
 
This leads us to the following. The CJEU’s Gazprom judgment did not completely meet 
the expectations placed on. The judgment does not overturn the court’s findings in the 
West Tankers case but neither does it provide further clarifications on the prohibition of 




This article depicts a shift in the relation between the Brussels I Regime and arbitration. 
As the ideological starting point highlighting total independence of civil procedure and 
arbitration has at least partly failed, the discussion on finding an interface between the 
two systems has proved to be useful already in itself. It has become clear that 
preserving the autonomy of both systems is not sufficient in itself but instead, further 
attention should be paid to addressing the interface. To put it concretely, this discussion 
has resulted in an attempt to reconcile the overlap areas through a compromise.  
 
The new Brussels Regulation (Recast) preserves the old status quo but with some 
clarifications. No new Articles were introduced. However, the Brussels I Regulation 
(Recast) includes recital 12 which clarifies the content of the preserved status quo and 
the content of legal exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Regulation. As is 
apparent from the discussion in the revision process, the new recitals in the Regulation 
have not solved the interface issues. In the end, no comprehensive solutions were found 
to overcome the problem of parallel proceedings in arbitration and cross-border civil 
procedure.  
 
Already the case-law concerning the old Brussels Convention and the Brussels I 
Regulation pointed out how the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Brussels I 
Regime was considered unproblematic and self-evident in theory but, in practice, 
several legally unclear issues ensued from it regardless. This unpredictability is the 
unavoidable consequence of regulating recognition and enforcement on a cross-border 
level between two partly overlapping, heterogeneous and complicated systems. As both 
arbitration and enforcing arbitral awards through New York Convention and Brussels I 
Regime rely on national systems for application, neither of the systems operates in a 
vacuum and complexity is largely endogenous. 
 
110 LEXONOMICA 
P. Hietanen-Kunwald, R. Koulu & S. Turunen: The New Brussels I Regime and 
Arbitration – Finding an Interface 
 
The CJEU has a significant role in formulating the future acquis on the collision of 
systems in practice. The relevance given to the new recitals is still open and needs to be 
addressed. Taking that into consideration, it is unclear how the National Navigation 
case would be solved in accordance with the new Brussels I Regime. In the light of 
recital 12, paragraph 2 it may be assumed that the English courts would not have 
considered to be bound by a decision of a court of another Member State on the 
preliminary question of the validity of the arbitration agreement.  
 
The CJEU’s judgment in the Gazprom case addressed two issues, arbitration exclusion 
and the prohibition of anti-suit injunctions, although the judgment falls short of the vast 
expectations laid on it. The Gazprom decision does not reverse the doctrine established 
in West Tankers and the role of anti-suit injunctions within the EU remains to some 
extent unclear. However, the formulation of the CJEU’s wording suggests that the issue 
of anti-suit injunctions as a means to battle parallel proceedings is not yet exhausted. In 
any case, the parallel proceedings are not the only interface problem between the 
systems of civil procedure and arbitration but instead the preservation of this systemic 
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